The Long-Run Demand for M2 Reconsidered by Altermatt, Sophie
 
Faculty of Business, Economics 
and Social Sciences 
 Department of Economics 
The Long-Run Demand for M2 Reconsidered 
 
 
Sophie Altermatt 
 
 
18-24 
 
 
March 2018 
Schanzeneckstrasse 1 
Postfach 8573 
CH-3001 Bern, Switzerland 
http://www.vwi.unibe.ch 
DISCUSSION PAPERS 
s
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
h
t
t
p
s
:
/
/
d
o
i
.
o
r
g
/
1
0
.
7
8
9
2
/
b
o
r
i
s
.
1
4
5
8
7
8
 
|
 
d
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
:
 
2
7
.
1
2
.
2
0
2
0
The Long-Run Demand for M2 Reconsidered
∗
Sophie Altermatt†
March 2018
Abstract
This paper reconsiders the long-run demand for M2 based on a newly con-
structed dataset featuring 32 countries since the first half of the 19th century.
The evidence from cointegration tests suggests that a long-run equilibrium re-
lationship for M2 demand is hardly present. Specifically, only for five countries
(Finland, Korea, Mexico, Paraguay and Taiwan) cointegration tests produce
strong evidence in favor of a stable long-run money demand. Evidence for Israel
and Lebanon is weaker, but still points towards a stable long-run demand for
M2. For all other countries evidence speaks against a stable money demand or
it is mixed across money demand specifications and/or type of cointegration
test.
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1 Introduction
Economists have been arguing about the usefulness of monetary aggregates for the
monetary policy-making process for a very long time. A necessary condition for
monetary aggregates to be useful in the conduct of monetary policy is that they
are systematically related to real activity, interest rates, and inflation. Over the
last three decades, most economists and central bankers have lost confidence in
monetary aggregates as information variables for monetary policy. The main reason
for the move away from monetary aggregates has been the alleged breakdown of a
stable long-run relationship between monetary aggregates, GDP and interest rates.
A related reason is the disappearance of the informational content of monetary
aggregates for variables such as inflation and nominal GDP within a low-inflation
environment (see e.g. Estrella and Mishkin, 1997).
For the United States, for example, there has been a broad consensus in the literature
that the stability of the demand for M1 broke down during the early 1980s,
1 possibly
prompted by deregulation and financial innovation. Indeed, recent work by Benati
et al. (2018) shows that once they augment the standard M1 aggregate with either
money market deposit accounts (MMDAs) or money market mutual funds (MMMFs)
or both,2 a long-run equilibrium relationship between the velocity of M1 and the
short-term interest rate can be re-established. Benati et al. (2018) further find
evidence of a stable long-run demand relationship for M1 for most of the 31 other
countries in their dataset, thus, providing evidence against the widespread view that
the long-run money demand is unstable. This new evidence naturally prompts the
question: What about broader aggregates?
Broader aggregates better internalize the substitution between different monetary
assets that may create instabilities in narrower definitions of money. For example,
MMDAs and MMMFs, whose introduction appears to have caused the instabilities
in the U.S. M1 demand, are both included in the standard M2 aggregate. Until the
beginning of the 1990s, U.S. long-run demand for M2 had indeed been generally
regarded as being more stable than that for narrower aggregates (see e.g. Hafer and
Jansen, 1991). Since the early 1990s, however, evidence of a stable long-run demand
for M2 has been mixed and inconclusive. One of the most cited studies exploring the
stability of U.S. money demand is the work of Friedman and Kuttner (1992). Based
on M2, they documented evidence of a stable money demand relationship for two
1see e.g. Friedman and Kuttner (1992).
2This adjustment of M1 was originally proposed by Goldfeld and Sichel (1990).
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sub-samples running from 1960 until either 1979 or 1990, but they found no evidence
for the period 1970-1990. Following the study of Friedman and Kuttner many authors
have extensively analyzed the long-run demand for M2 for the United States using
different samples, money demand specifications and cointegration tests. The resulting
evidence is very mixed. Miyao (1996) explores the existence of stable money demand
relationships involving M2 based on several alternative money demand specifications
and cointegration tests. In line with Friedman and Kuttner (1992) he finds that
evidence of cointegration is stronger for the period 1959-1988, whereas evidence is
typically weaker based on sub-samples extending to the early 1990s. For neither
period, however, evidence of cointegration is consistent across all of the different
tests. Carlson et al. (2000) confirm that the inclusion of data from the 1990s destroys
evidence of a stable long-run demand for M2. In contrast, Lown et al. (2006) find no
evidence of a stable M2 demand for a sub-sample ending in 1988, but they detect
a cointegrating relation for two sub-samples including data up to 1994 and 2004,
respectively. Haug and Tam (2007) find cointegration in the M2 demand relationship
for a long sample going from 1869 through 1999 and for a post-WWII sample running
from 1946 to 1999.
Many studies focus exclusively on the United States3 and most consider only the
post-World War II experience. An exception is the work of Bordo, Jonung (1990,
2009) and Siklos (1993, 1997), who extensively analyze the long-run M2 demand for
the major industrial countries based on a dataset beginning in 1870.
Almost the entire existing literature relies on cointegration tests based on asymptotic
critical and p-values. The poor asymptotic properties of cointegration tests are,
however, well-known and documented, for example, by Johansen (2002). Further,
many studies include ad-hoc variables, such as institutional proxies, break-adjustment
dummies or uncertainty measures, in the money demand equation (see, for example,
Bordo, Jonung and Siklos), thus making their analyses hard to compare.
In this paper I re-investigate the long-run relationship between M2, GDP and short-
term interest rates based on a dataset featuring 32 countries4 since the first half
of the 19th century, extending the work of Benati et al. (2018) to M2. For each
country I use the longest period for which these three time series are available. To the
3Exceptions are documented in Sriram (2000) who provides a survey of empirical money demand
studies across a range of countries.
4A majority of the countries under investigation are the same as examined by Benati et al.
(2018). Since data on M2 are not available for some countries, I excluded them from the analysis.
Instead, a few other countries are added for which data exist on M2 but not on M1. Specifically,
these countries are Belize, Ecuador, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Paraguay, Peru and Sweden.
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very best of my knowledge, this is the most extensive investigation of the long-run
demand for M2 ever done. Following Benati et al. (2018), this analysis is conducted
based on two cointegration tests taking either cointegration or no cointegration as
their null hypothesis (Shin’s and Johansen’s tests, respectively). In order to address
the well-known issue of the poor finite-sample performance of cointegration tests, I
use bootstrapped p-values, which—as documented via Monte Carlo by Benati et al.
(2018)—perform better than asymptotic values in small samples. For the countries
for which data are available since the 19th century, I perform separate analyses for
the Gold Standard5 and for the subsequent period. The main reason for analyzing
the two periods separately is that several key macroeconomic stylized facts have
been radically different before and after 1914. In particular, by the very nature of
the Gold Standard—which made inflation strongly mean-reverting6—based on the
Fisher effect nominal interest rates should logically be expected to also be stationary.
Since cointegration tests are predicated on the assumption that all of the series under
investigation are integrated of order one,7 both unit root tests and cointegration
tests should be performed separately for the two periods.
I consider five alternative money demand specifications. Three of them feature M2
velocity and a short-term nominal interest rate: they are the traditional semi-log and
log-log money demand models, and a specification in the levels of velocity and the
short rate along the lines of Selden (1956) and Latané (1960). All these specifications
implicitly restrict the income elasticity to one. The other two specifications are
unrestricted: one expresses the demand for nominal M2 as a function of nominal
GDP and a short-term nominal interest rate, whereas the other models the demand
for real M2 as a function of real GDP and an interest rate. Whenever both nominal
and real GDP are available, I perform cointegration tests based on all of the five
money demand specifications.8
The main results I obtain can be summarized as follows. In contrast to Benati et al.’s
(2018) results for M1, for the overwhelming majority of countries cointegration tests
do not detect a stable long-run demand for M2. Specifically, only for five countries
5The Gold Standard period is assumed to have ended in 1914, with the outbreak of World War
I.
6See Barsky (1987) and Benati (2008).
7For Johansen’s tests see, e.g., Hamilton (1994, p. 571). For Shin’s tests, see Shin (1994).
8Estimating unrestricted specifications with either nominal or real M2 and GDP makes sense if
and only if the income elasticity is different from one. Otherwise, the two specifications with either
nominal or real series are identical. Since income elasticity might differ from one, and since, for
many countries, the nominal specification cannot be tested because the series are of a higher order
of integration, I consider both real and nominal unrestricted specifications.
4
(Finland, Korea, Mexico, Paraguay and Taiwan) do tests produce strong evidence of
a long-run money demand. Evidence for Israel and Lebanon is weaker, but still points
towards a stable long-run demand for M2. In all other cases evidence is mixed across
specifications and/or type of cointegration tests. Further, the log-log specification
does not seem to work well for M2 for any country in the dataset. In fact, it is the
only specification under consideration based on which the cointegration tests do not
produce consistent evidence in favor of cointegration for any country. This is in
contrast to the findings of Benati et al. (2018) for M1, for which the data seem to
prefer the log-log specification over the semi-log and the Selden-Latané specifications
for countries in which inflation is very high (e.g. for countries such as Argentina or
Israel).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I introduce the newly
constructed dataset, and I discuss the visual evidence of the relationship between M2
velocity and the short rate. In section 3, I discuss the empirical strategy. In sections
4 and 5, I assess the integration properties of the data and the persistence of the
cointegration residuals, respectively, whereas in section 6, I present and discuss the
results from cointegration tests. Section 7 concludes.
2 A preliminary look at the data
Before introducing the statistical methods, I briefly discuss some noteworthy features
of the dataset, and I show visual evidence of the relationship between M2 velocity
and the short rate.
2.1 The data
The dataset features annual data for 32 countries. I select countries with uninterrupted
annual time series of nominal M2, nominal GDP, and a short-term nominal interest
rate9 for at least 30 years. In a few cases (detailed below), data for real GDP and
the GDP deflator are also available. The sample length varies across countries: the
shortest sample features 30 years (for Germany and Mexico), whereas the longest
one (for the United States) features 100 years. A detailed description of the data
can be found in appendix D. I use annual data because annual series are typically
available for longer time spans than higher-frequency data. Since cointegration is a
9For Brazil, Paraguay and Peru no long enough series for the short rate is available. In those
cases, I use consumer price inflation or, for Brazil, GDP deflator inflation, as an opportunity cost
variable.
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long-run concept, the frequency of data is, as a matter of logic, irrelevant for the
issue at hand, since increasing the sample size by increasing the sampling frequency
(instead of increasing the sample length) does not increase the extent of information
for the issue at hand.10
For the United States I consider two different series for M2 for the period 1915-2014.
The first series is constructed by linking the M2 series from Friedman and Schwartz
(1970), for the period 1915-1958, to the M2SL series from the St. Louis FED’s
FRED II for the period 1959-2014. From now on, this series is referred to as the
Friedman-Schwartz M2 aggregate (FS M2). The second series is from Lucas and
Nicolini (2015), and in what follows is referred to as the Lucas-Nicolini M2 aggregate
(LN M2). The main difference between the two series is that for the period 1947-1958
Lucas and Nicolini use data from Robert Rasche (1990), and afterwards they use
end-of-period data from FRED. For robustness reasons, in what follows I consider
both series. In order to make the overall discussion more concise, however, in the main
text I only report and discuss results based on the Friedman-Schwartz aggregate,
whereas I mention those based on the Lucas-Nicolini aggregate only if they differ in
a material way from those based on the Friedman-Schwartz aggregate.11
2.2 Visual evidence on the relationship between M2 velocity
and the short rate
Figures 1-3 show, for all countries in the dataset, M2 velocity together with a short-
term nominal interest rate. In order to better highlight the relationship between
the two series, I have subtracted from either of them its sample mean, and I have
divided it by its sample standard deviation, thus making them unit-free. For the
high-inflation countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Israel, Peru and Venezuela) I show
the logarithms of the series, whereas for all other countries I show the levels.
Figures 1 and 2 show the series for the post-WWI period. A strong and positive
relationship between M2 velocity and the short rate is visible for Belize, Finland
(1946-1985), Israel, Korea, Lebanon, Mexico and Taiwan. For most of these countries,
velocity declines over the entire sample period, thus tracking quite closely the
downward trend in the short rate. The pattern differs for Finland and Lebanon, with
10See e.g. Siklos (1993); Hendry (1986); Perron (1989).
11I focus on the Friedman-Schwartz M2 aggregate for the following reason. Looking at the
log-differences of either M2 aggregate on the left hand side of figure C.9 one can see that they are
essentially identical up to 1947, and reasonably close starting from 1949. In 1948, on the other hand,
there is a huge difference between Friedman-Schwartz aggregate and the one from Lucas-Nicolini:
in particular, the one from Lucas-Nicolini exhibits a spike, which makes this series less plausible.
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the short rate and velocity trending upwards over the entire period in the former
case and with both series exhibiting a hump-shaped relationship in the latter case.
For Guatemala and Japan a relationship between the short rate and M2 is visible,
but it is less strong. For Argentina, the United States and Turkey a relationship
between the two series is only apparent for certain sub-periods. For Argentina a
close relationship is apparent until the mid-1950s, whereas since then the two series
have behaved differently, with velocity increasing sharply until the beginning of the
1960s, and then declining until the mid-1970s, and the short rate steadily increasing
over the entire period until 1984. For the United States the relationship had been
strong until the mid-1960s, whereas it has been much less apparent ever since, with
the sensitivity of velocity to interest rate fluctuations being smaller than before,
and the peaks in the two series being about a decade apart.12 Turkey’s interest rate
exhibits a hump-shaped behavior, which is, since the late 1980s, roughly mirrored by
M2 velocity. Strikingly, for a group of countries the relationship between the short
rate and M2 velocity even appears to be negative. This is the case for Canada, Italy,
Paraguay, South Africa, Spain and Venezuela. For the remaining countries, the data
do not point towards any obvious relationship between M2 velocity and the short
rate.
Figure 3 shows evidence for the Gold Standard period. Interestingly, in almost all
cases M2 velocity follows a downward trend which flattens in the early 1900. The
short-term interest rate, however, only follows a similar pattern in the cases of Italy
and the United States. In most other cases the short rate exhibits some sort of an
inverse hump-shaped pattern.
Overall, visual evidence is very mixed and, in general, it does not point towards
a strong and stable long-run relationship between M2 velocity and the short rate
in most countries. The subsequent statistical analysis will confirm that detecting a
cointegration relationship between M2 velocity and the short rate is difficult indeed.
12Based on the Lucas-Nicolini M2 aggregate the relationship is even less apparent, as can be
seen in figure C.9 in the appendix.
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Figure 1: M2 velocity and the short-term nominal interest rate (all series are demeaned and
standardized)
8
1960 1980 2000
-1
0
1
2
3
Korea (1960-2014)
Short rate
M2 velocity
1980 1990 2000 2010
-1
0
1
2
Lebanon (1977-2014)
Short rate
M2 velocity
1980 1990 2000 2010
-1
0
1
2
Malaysia (1980-2012)
Short rate
M2 velocity
1990 2000 2010
-1
0
1
2
3
Mexico (1985-2014)
Short rate
M2 velocity
1960 1970 1980 1990
-2
-1
0
1
2
Netherlands (1957-1992)
Short rate
M2 velocity
1960 1980 2000
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
Norway (1946-2013)
Short rate
M2 velocity
19701980199020002010
-1
0
1
2
3
Paraguay (1962-2014)
CPI inflation
M2 velocity
1960 1980 2000
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Peru (1960-2014)
Log CPI inflation
Log M2 velocity
1920 1940 1960 1980
-1
0
1
2
3
Portugal (1914-1998)
Short rate
M2 velocity
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
-1
0
1
2
South Africa (1967-2014)
Short rate
M2 velocity
19501960197019801990
-1
0
1
2
3
Spain (1946-1997)
Short rate
M2 velocity
1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Sweden (1914-2010)
Short rate
M2 velocity
19701980199020002010
-1
0
1
2
Taiwan (1962-2014)
Short rate
M2 velocity
1980 1990 2000 2010
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Turkey (1977-2014)
Short rate
M2 velocity
1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
United States (1915-2014)
Short rate
M2 velocity
1970 1980 1990
-1
0
1
2
Venezuela (1962-1998)
Log short rate
Log M2 velocity
Figure 2: M2 velocity and the short-term nominal interest rate (all series are demeaned and
standardized)
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Figure 3: M2 velocity and the short-term nominal interest rate (all series are demeaned and
standardized)
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3 Empirical methodology
I explore the long-run demand for M2 for five different money demand specifications
via cointegration methods.
3.1 Money demand specifications
In general, the demand for money (M), either nominal or real, is expressed as a
function of either nominal or real income (Y ) and an opportunity cost variable
(R), with money demand being typically assumed to be increasing in income, and
decreasing in the opportunity cost:
M = f(Y,R)
(+), (−)
. (1)
Another way of expressing money demand is in terms of money velocity (V ), defined
as the ratio between nominal income and the nominal money stock (V = Y/M),
with velocity being typically assumed to be an increasing function of the opportunity
cost of money:
V = f(R
(+)
). (2)
The analysis in this paper considers five different money demand specifications. I
mostly focus on the three bivariate money demand systems, featuring M2 velocity
and a short-term nominal interest rate as opportunity cost variable. Let M , Y , and
R denote nominal M2, nominal output, and a nominal interest rate (with m, y and
r denoting the corresponding variables in logarithms). The three bivariate long-run
money demand functions can then be written as:
ln
(
Mt
Yt
)
= mt − yt = µ+ θrRt + εt, (3)
ln
(
Mt
Yt
)
= mt − yt = µ+ θrrt + εt, (4)
Mt
Yt
=
1
µ+ δRt
+ εt, (5)
where θr is the interest rate (semi-) elasticity.
Equations (3) and (4) describe the standard ‘semi-log’ and ‘log-log’ specifications,
which have dominated the literature on long-run money demand since the early 1960s,
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whereas equation (5) is along the lines of the money demand specifications estimated
by Richard Selden (1956) and Henry Allen Latané (1960). This specification postulates
a linear relationship between money velocity, defined as the ratio of nominal GDP to
nominal M2, and the short rate: Vt = µ+ δRt + εt. In what follows it will be referred
to as the Selden-Latané specification. The rationale for considering this specification
is that, as shown by Benati et al. (2018), based on M1 the data seem to prefer it for
several low-inflation countries (first and foremost, the United States).13
In the bivariate money demand specifications the income elasticity is restricted to
one. Since income elasticity might differ from one, I also perform cointegration tests
for two unrestricted specifications featuring either nominal or real M2 and GDP,
and the short rate. If, however, the income elasticity actually is equal to one, the
two specifications with either nominal or real series are identical and it does not
make sense to estimate both specifications. I consider both specifications because,
for many countries, the nominal specification cannot be tested because the series are
of a higher order of integration. Equations (6) and (7) describe unrestricted money
demand specifications featuring the logarithms of either nominal or real M2 and
GDP, and the nominal interest rate in levels.14
mt = µ+ θyyt + θrRt + εt, (6)
mt − pt = µ+ θy(yt − pt) + θrRt + εt, (7)
where p is the price level in logarithms and θy is the income elasticity.
3.2 Cointegration tests
I investigate the existence of a long-run demand for M2 via cointegration methods
(see Engle and Granger, 1987). Since the variables entering the money demand
function are typically found to be non-stationary, cointegration analysis has become
the standard method for searching for a stable long-run money demand relationship
(see, e.g., Friedman and Kuttner, 1992; Stock and Watson, 1993; Miyao, 1996).
In a cointegrated system the long-run relationship between the series is driven by
permanent shocks. Permanent changes in one variable map into corresponding
permanent changes in the other variables of the system. Further, the finding of a
13A theoretical derivation of the Selden-Latané specification can be found in Benati et al. (2018).
14For the high-inflation countries – Chile, Israel and Venezuela – the short rate is in logarithms.
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cointegration relationship implies that the error term—also known as cointegration
residual—of the cointegration equation is stationary. Stationarity of the cointegration
residual in turn implies that any deviation from the system’s long-run equilibrium is
transitory, and thus is bound to disappear in the long-run, so that the equilibrium is
restored.
Following Benati et al. (2018), I perform cointegration tests that take either coin-
tegration (Shin’s (1994) test) or no cointegration (Johansen’s (1988, 1991) tests)
as the null hypothesis. Johansen’s tests consist of two types, either the trace or
the maximum eigenvalue test. The former is a test of the null hypothesis of no
cointegration against the alternative of one or more cointegrating vectors, whereas
the latter is a test of the null hypothesis of h cointegrating vectors against the
alternative of h+1 cointegrating vectors, with h = 0, 1, 2, ... . Shin’s test, on the
other hand, is a residual-based test of the null hypothesis that the residual of the
cointegrating regression has no random walk component. I bootstrap critical and
p-values based on the process which is relevant under the null hypothesis, setting
the number of bootstrap replications to 10,000.
As for Johansen’s tests, I bootstrap trace and the maximum eigenvalue test statistics
as in Cavaliere et al. (2012) (henceforth, CRT).15 Benati et al. show via Monte
Carlo simulations that if the data-generation process (henceforth, DGP) does not
feature cointegration, bootstrapping the p-values as in CRT systematically and often
significantly improves the performance of the tests in small samples. If, however, a
system does feature cointegration, bootstrapping Johansen’s tests performs well if
and only if the persistence of the cointegration residual is sufficiently low and/or
the sample size is sufficiently large.16 This is in line with some of the evidence
reported in Engle and Granger (1987), who first pointed out how, in small samples, a
highly persistent cointegration residual makes it very difficult to detect cointegration
based on the Dickey-Fuller test statistic. The intuition is that, in finite samples, a
cointegrated process with a highly persistent cointegration residual is difficult to
distinguish from a non-cointegrated process. In particular, the more persistent the
15For the test of the null hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative of one or more
cointegrating vectors this is a non-cointegrated vector autoregression (VAR) in differences. For
the test of the null hypothesis of h versus h+1 cointegration vectors this is the VECM estimated
under the null of h cointegrating vectors (i.e., for the test of 0 versus 1 cointegration vectors it is a
non-cointegrated VAR in differences as for the trace test).
16In particular, the Monte Carlo evidence in Benati et al. (2018, Table E.1) shows that for
a sample length of T = 100 and a persistence of ρ = 0.75 (ρ = 0.9), the null hypothesis of no
cointegration is rejected in 43.3 (16.7) percent of the times. For T = 50 and ρ = 0.75 (ρ = 0.9),
the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected in 18.4 (11.7) percent of the times.
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residual, and the shorter the sample, the more difficult it is to distinguish between
the two.
As for Shin’s test, Benati et al. (2018) propose a bootstrap procedure which is based
on the same general principle underlying CRT’s, that is: computing critical and
p-values by bootstrapping the process which is relevant under the null hypothesis.
Within the present case, the process to be bootstrapped is a vector error-correction
model (VECM) estimated under the null hypothesis of one cointegrating vector.
Shin’s test statistic is computed based on a model with an intercept, but no time
trend.17 Benati et al.’s Monte Carlo simulations show that if the true DGP does
feature cointegration and the persistence of the cointegration residual is high, the
proposed bootstrapping procedure performs better than Shin’s asymptotic critical
values.18 However, if the true DGP does not feature cointegration, even in large
samples cointegration is rejected far too seldom.19 Lack of rejection of the null of
cointegration thus cannot be interpreted as strong evidence that the series are truly
cointegrated.
In summary, Johansen’s tests detecting cointegration can be taken as strong evidence
in favor of cointegration, whereas Shin’s tests not rejecting the null of cointegration
only represents weak evidence in favor of cointegration. On the other hand, if
Johansen’s tests do not detect cointegration, this might be due to the high persistence
of the cointegration residual and/or a short sample period. Finally, Monte Carlo
evidence suggests that, in general, Shin’s test is less informative than Johansen’s.
Therefore, in what follows I will de-emphasize the results produced by Shin’s tests,
and I will instead mostly focus on those produced by Johansen’s methodology.
Benati et al.’s Monte Carlo evidence shows that the performance of either Johansen’s
or Shin’s tests crucially depends on the persistence of the cointegration residual.
Before examining the results produced by cointegration tests, I will therefore explore
the persistence of the candidate cointegration residuals (defined below) produced by
each of the five previously discussed money demand specifications. In the next section
I start by discussing the integration properties of the data. For all countries for which
17See equation (2) in Shin (1994, p. 93). The test statistic is computed using the Quadratic
Spectral kernel. Following Shin (1994) and Benati et al. (2018), the number of leads and lags used
in the dynamic OLS estimation of Shin’s regression is set to K = [T 1/3], where [x] stands for ‘the
largest integer of x’.
18The critical values reported in Shin (1994, p. 100) turn out to be valid only if the cointegration
residual is white noise.
19In particular, Monte Carlo evidence in Benati et al. (2018, Table E.2) shows that in samples
of length T =100, cointegration is rejected at the 10 percent level only in 31 percent of the cases,
whereas in samples of length T = 50, which is about the length of most of our samples, cointegration
is rejected 18 percent of the times.
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the I(1) assumption is satisfied for the relevant series, I then explore, in section 5, the
persistence of candidate cointegration residuals. In section 6 I then turn to discussing
the results produced by cointegration tests, in the light of the respective sample
lengths, and of the estimated persistence of the candidate cointegration residuals.
4 Integration properties of the data
A key assumption underlying both Johansen’s and Shin’s tests is that all of the
variables entering either the cointegrated system (in the former case), or the coin-
tegrating regression (in the latter one) are I(1).20 Before testing for cointegration,
the stationarity properties of the series under investigation ought therefore to be
ascertained.
Table A.3 in the appendix reports bootstrapped p-values for the Elliott, Rothenberg,
and Stock (1996) unit root tests for all series in the dataset. Consistent with the
five previously discussed money demand specifications, the tested series are M2
velocity and the short rate (either in levels or in logarithms), and the logarithms of
either nominal or real GDP and M2. The p-values have been computed based on
10,000 bootstrap replications of estimated ARIMA(p,1,0) processes. For reasons of
robustness, for each variable I consider two alternative lag orders, either 1 or 2 years.
For the logarithms of either real or nominal GDP and M2 the estimated models
feature an intercept and a time trend. In contrast, for M2 velocity and the short
rate (either in levels or in logarithms), the models include only an intercept, but
no time trend.21 Throughout, I use 10 percent as the benchmark level to test for a
unit root. If, for a specific series, the tests based on the two lag order specifications
produces contrasting results, I regard the null of a unit root as not having been
convincingly rejected, and I therefore assume that the series under consideration has
a unit root.22 In order to ascertain that the order of integration of the series I am
20See Hamilton (1994) and Shin (1994), respectively.
21As discussed by Hamilton (1994, p. 501) a general principle underlying unit root tests is to
choose a specification which also represents a plausible description of the data under the alternative
hypothesis. The fact that both M2 and GDP exhibit obvious trends justifies the inclusion of a
linear time trend in the estimated model for these series. As for the short rate, on the one hand
it is bounded from below by the zero lower bound, whereas on the other hand economic theory
suggests that it should not be expected to increase without bounds. As for velocity the exclusion
of a time trend is less obvious, since (i) in several countries M2 velocity exhibits obvious trends,
and (ii) Benati et al.’s (2018) conceptual argument for not including a time trend only holds for a
demand for money for transaction purposes (that is, for M1). For these reasons I also test for a
unit root in M2 velocity including a linear time rend, and I report the results in case they differ
from those produced by the setup without a time trend.
22This is the case for the short rate in levels and in logarithms for Chile (1941-1995), Germany
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working with is at most one, unit root tests are also conducted on either their first-
or their log-differences.23 Table A.4 reports the bootstrapped p-values for either the
first- or the log-difference of either series, and based on both lag orders. If a unit
root can be rejected based on both lag orders, in what follows I assume that the
series is I(1). If a unit root is not rejected based on either one or both lag orders, I
assume instead that the series’ order of integration is greater than one, so that it
cannot be included in either a cointegrating system, or a cointegrating regression.
4.1 The short rate
Evidence of a unit root in the short-term nominal interest rate (either in levels or in
logarithms) is strong in almost all countries for the period since the beginning of
World War I.24 For the Gold Standard period the tests clearly reject a unit root in
the short rate (both in levels and in logarithms) for Norway, Finland and Spain. Unit
root tests for the first- or log-differences of the short rate cannot reject a unit root for
Morocco and Turkey, thus indicating that either the short rate, or its logarithm, is
integrated of an order higher than one. For all of these cases cointegration cannot be
tested based on any specification and they are, therefore, excluded from the analysis.
For Belize and Italy (1948-1998), the logarithm of the short rate has a order of
integration higher than one. As a result, cointegration cannot be tested based on the
log-log specification. For Argentina, on the other hand, the short rate in levels has a
higher integration order. In this case cointegration cannot be tested based on either
the semi-log or the Selden-Latané specification.
4.2 M2 velocity
Evidence of a unit root in the logarithm of M2 velocity is strong for all cases except
Norway (1946-2013), Israel, and Italy under the Gold Standard: in either of these
cases, a unit root can be rejected based on both lag orders. Including a time trend
(1960-1989), Israel, and Canada and the United States under the gold standard, and for the
logarithm of the short rate for Mexico, and for the logarithms of velocity for Chile (1941-1995),
Finland (1946-1985), Jordan and Taiwan.
23For these tests, the estimated models include an intercept, but no time trend.
24The only exception is Finland (1946-1985) for which the short rate in logarithms is stationary
based on both lag order specifications. Thus, for Finland (1946-1985) the cointegration cannot be
tested based on the log-log specification. For Brazil, Paraguay and Peru, for which I either use GDP
deflator inflation or CPI inflation as an opportunity cost variable, the series is stationary either in
levels (Brazil, Peru) or in logarithms (Paraguay). Thus, for Brazil and Peru cointegration cannot
be tested based on the semi-log or the Selden-Latané specification and for Paraguay cointegration
cannot be tested based on the log-log specification.
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changes the results for Israel, and for Italy under the Gold Standard.25 In what
follows I will therefore assume that either series is non-stationary. For Norway,
including a time trend does not produce a different result. With the logarithm of
velocity being stationary, it is not possible to perform cointegration tests based on
either the semi-log or the log-log specification. In what follows I therefore ignore,
for Norway, either of the two specifications. For the level of M2 a unit root gets
rejected more often: either Finland, Italy and Sweden under the Gold Standard; or
Chile, Israel, Japan, Jordan,26 Norway and Taiwan for the period since 1914 exhibit
stationary M2 velocity series. For Finland under the Gold Standard period, for which
also the short rate is stationary, the Selden-Latané specification can be estimated
using a bivariate VAR in levels.27 Further, the fact that both series are I(0) is
compatible with—although it does represent a proof of—the existence of a long-run
demand for M2. In all of the other cases, on the other hand, it is not possible to
perform cointegration tests based on the Selden-Latané specification. Finally, for
Italy (1948-1998), Morocco, and Venezuela, and for Canada under the Gold Standard,
either the level or the logarithm of velocity is integrated of a higher order than one.
In those cases, cointegration cannot be tested based on the relevant specification.
4.3 Nominal GDP and nominal M2
In most cases, a unit root in nominal GDP and nominal M2 cannot be rejected
at the 10 percent level for either of the two lag orders considered.28 However, for
Canada under the Gold Standard, and for 22 countries29 for the period since 1914,
unit root tests for the variables in log-differences suggest that for nominal GDP
and/or nominal M2 the order of integration is greater than one. These countries will
therefore be excluded from the analysis based on unrestricted specifications featuring
the logarithms of nominal GDP and M2.
25For Israel the p-values change to 0.185 and 0.001 based on the two lag orders, whereas for
Italy (1861-1913) they change to 0.153 and 0.830, respectively.
26For Jordan, including a time trend leads to p-values equal to 0.049 and 0.899, respectively. In
what follows I will therefore assume that this velocity series is non-stationary.
27Estimating a bivariate VAR featuring M2 velocity and the short rate with 10,000 bootstrap
replications yields a bias-corrected median estimate of the coefficient on the short rate of 0.00. The
coefficient is not significantly different from zero.
28The exceptions are Israel, Mexico and Denmark under the Gold Standard, for all of which
nominal M2 is stationary.
29Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile (1941-1995), Colombia, Germany, Guatemala, Italy, Japan,
Jordan, Korea, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Paraguay, Peru, Spain, Taiwan,
Turkey and Venezuela.
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4.4 Real GDP and real M2
The logarithm of real M2 is uniformly I(1), with the exceptions of Norway during
either the Gold Standard or the period since 1914 (in both cases it is stationary);
and of Italy (1948-1998), Japan, and Canada during the Gold Standard, for which
the order of integration is greater than one.
Real GDP is non-stationary as well, with the exception of Finland (1914-1985), for
which unit root tests clearly reject a unit root based on both lag orders. For Canada
during the Gold Standard, and for Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Taiwan during
the period since 1914, unit root tests for the variables in log-differences suggest that
the order of integration of log real GDP is greater than one. Therefore, for all of these
countries I do not perform cointegration tests based on unrestricted specification
including real GDP and real M2.
4.5 Summing up
Altogether, in 30 cases cointegration can be tested based on the semi-log specification30
and based on the log-log specification.31 Cointegration tests based on the Selden-
Latané specification can be conducted for 20 countries32 for the period since 1914,
as well as for Denmark, Germany and the United States under the Gold Standard.
The unrestricted nominal specification is analyzed for Belize, Denmark, Ecuador,
Finland for the period 1946-1985 and for the period 1914-1985, Norway, Portugal,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden and the United States since 1914, and for Italy, Sweden
and the United States under the Gold Standard. Based on unrestricted specifications
featuring real GDP and real M2, cointegration can be tested for 13 countries
33 for
the period since 1914, and for Denmark, Italy, Sweden and the United States under
the Gold Standard.
30Denmark, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the United States during the Gold Standard; and
Belize, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland for the period 1946-1985 and for the
period 1914-1985, Germany, Guatemala, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico,
Netherlands, Paraguay, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan and the United States over
the period since 1914
31Argentina, Peru and the countries above, except for Belize and Paraguay
32Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland for the period 1946-1985 and for the period
1914-1985, Germany, Guatemala, Jordan, Korea, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Paraguay,
Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and the United States
33Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland for the period 1946-1985 and for the period
1914-1985, Israel, Korea, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the United States and Venezuela
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5 Assessing the persistence of candidate cointe-
gration residuals
Since, as previously discussed, the performance of cointegration tests crucially hinges
on the persistence of the cointegration residual, before turning to the evidence from
cointegration analysis I explore the persistence of candidate cointegration residuals.
‘Candidate cointegration residual’ (henceforth, CCR) is an expression used by Benati
et al. (2018) to indicate the linear combination of the I(1) variables in the system
which will indeed be regarded as a cointegration residual if cointegration actually is
detected.34
Tables A.1 and A.2 report Hansen (1999)’s ‘grid bootstrap’35 median-unbiased (hence-
forth, MUB) estimates of the sum of the AR coefficients in AR(2) representations for
the CCRs. From now on, I will refer to this object as ρ̂MUB. The results reported in
the tables are based on Johansen’s estimator of the cointegration vector. For each
value of the sum of the AR coefficients in the grid I use 2,000 bootstrap replications.
Table A.1 reports evidence for the bivariate specifications. Based on semi-log spec-
ifications, ρ̂MUB ranges from 0.30 for Germany (1960-1989) to 0.98 for Portugal
(1914-1998) and Jordan. Based on the log-log specification and the Selden-Latané
specification, it lies within a similar range. Across all three specifications, CCRs
exhibit a non-negligible, and sometimes high, or very high extent of persistence.
Based on all three bivariate specifications, ρ̂MUB is greater than or equal to 0.9
in roughly a third of the cases. Further, in many cases the 90 percent confidence
interval includes 1.00. Based on the log-log specification, for eight countries ρ̂MUB is
considerably higher than for the semi-log or the Selden-Latané specifications. These
countries are Chile, Ecuador, Israel, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Spain, and
Taiwan.
Table A.2 reports results based on unrestricted trivariate specifications. Out of the 13
possible cases for which cointegration tests can be performed based on specifications
featuring nominal GDP and M2, four have a value of ρ̂MUB exceeding 0.9. For the
remaining cases, ρ̂MUB ranges between 0.29 and 0.86. As for specifications featuring
real GDP and real M2, in five cases out of a total of 17 ρ̂MUB is greater than 0.9, in
three cases it is between 0.75 and 0.9, and in the remaining nine cases it is below
34The reason for labelling it as a ‘candidate’ is that, as previously discussed, if a cointegration
residual is very highly persistent, cointegration will likely not be detected.
35This ‘grid bootstrap’ method for the construction of confidence-intervals proposed by Hansen
(1999) performs better than conventional bootstrap methods when the sampling distribution depends
upon the parameter of interest.
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0.75.
Under these circumstances, Johansen’s tests will have a hard time detecting cointe-
gration even if it truly is in the data. Based on the Monte Carlo evidence reported
in Benati et al. (2018, table C.1), if the true DGP features cointegration, based on a
sample period of length T = 100 (T = 50), and a persistence of the cointegration
residual equal to ρ = 0.9, Johansen’s tests correctly reject the null of no cointegration
only 16.7 (11.7) percent of the times. If ρ = 0.75, the fraction of rejections is 43.3
(18.4) percent. This suggests that especially in cases characterized by small samples
and a highly persistent cointegration residual, Johansen’s tests will likely not detect
cointegration.
6 Evidence from cointegration tests
This section presents the results from cointegration tests based on any of the five
money demand specifications considered herein. I mostly focus on the results based
on the bivariate specifications and only briefly comment on the results based on
unrestricted specifications.
6.1 Bivariate specifications
Table 1 reports the bootstrapped p-values for Johansen’s and Shin’s tests based on
the semi-log, the log-log, and the Selden-Latané specification. The bootstrapped
p-values are based on 10,000 bootstrap replications. Figures B.1-B.6 in the appendix
report the estimated CCRs produced by the Johansen procedure for all specifications.
More specifically, figures B.1 and B.2 show the estimated CCRs based on the semi-log
specification, figures B.3 and B.4, and figures B.5 and B.6 show the estimated CCRs
based on the log-log specification and the Selden-Latané specification, respectively.
For most countries, either test clearly speaks against cointegration, or they produce
contrasting evidence (e.g., with both Johansen’s and Shin’s tests not rejecting the
null). In the light of the visual evidence discussed in section 2.2 this was largely
expected. On the other hand, based on the previous discussion of how the persistence
of the cointegration residual impacts upon the performance of cointegration tests, we
know that even if there is cointegration in the data, given the overall non-negligible
persistence in actual CCRs, Johansen’s tests will likely have a hard time detecting it.
It is therefore essential to carefully interpret the results produced by cointegration
tests, in order to determine whether there really is no cointegration relationship in
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the data, or whether the persistence in the cointegration residual is just too high
and/or the sample period too short for the tests to be able to detect cointegration.
This requires a careful analysis of the results, taking all necessary features of the
data into account.
In general, the semi-log and the Selden-Latané specifications produce very similar
results. Based on the log-log specification, on the other hand, Johansen’s tests and
Shin’s test provide contrasting evidence in most cases. In the following, I discuss the
individual cases in detail to gain a better understanding of the results.
6.1.1 Cases in which the evidence points towards cointegration
The few cases for which evidence uniformly points towards a cointegration relationship
in the data are reported in this sub-section. Based on the semi-log specification,
Johansen’s and Shin’s tests both detect cointegration in the following six cases:
Israel, Korea, Mexico, Paraguay, Taiwan, and Italy under the Gold Standard. These
results are largely in line with the visual evidence discussed in section 2.2, with the
exception of Paraguay for which no apparent relationship between M2 velocity and
CPI inflation is visible. Based on the Selden-Latané specification, the tests confirm
the presence of a cointegration relation in the cases of Korea, Mexico and Paraguay.
In addition, they detect cointegration for Finland (1946-1985) and Lebanon. For
the other three countries the Selden-Latané specification could not be tested due to
M2 velocity being stationary. Finally, based on the log-log specification there is no
uniform evidence of cointegration for any country.
6.1.2 Cases in which the tests produce conflicting evidence
Based on the semi-log specification, cointegration tests produce conflicting evidence
in 14 cases, with neither Johansen’s nor Shin’s tests rejecting the null.36 Specifically,
this is the case for Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the United States for the Gold
Standard period; and for Belize, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland
(1946-1985), Guatemala, Japan, Lebanon, Spain, and the United States based on
the Lucas-Nicolini aggregate for the period since 1914. From Benati et al. (2018)’s
Monte Carlo evidence on the performance of cointegration tests, which was discussed
in section 3, we know that, even in large samples, Shin’s test has problems in
rejecting the null of cointegration if the true DGP does not feature it. Therefore,
36On the other hand, only in a single case do Shin’s tests reject cointegration and Johansen’s
tests reject no cointegration. This is the case for Jordan based on the Selden-Latané specification.
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as previously discussed, the fact that Shin’s tests do not reject the null does not
represent strong evidence that cointegration truly is in the data, and, accordingly,
we should not put too much emphasis on these results. Since, on the other hand,
Johansen’s tests have problems in detecting cointegration if the cointegration residual
is highly persistent and/or the sample period is short, I turn to analyzing the
persistence and stationarity of CCRs. CCRs appear to be stationary for Denmark,
Germany, Sweden and the United States under the Gold Standard; and for Belize,
Colombia, Denmark (1923-2011), Finland (1946-1985), Guatemala, Japan, Lebanon,
and the United States based on the Lucas-Nicolini aggregate for the period since 1914.
For the United States (1915-2014), Denmark (1923-2011), Colombia, Guatemala
and Lebanon estimated ρ̂MUB’s are quite high (at 0.90, 0.91, 0.88, 0.82 and 0.81,
respectively), which could explain why Johansen’s tests do not detect cointegration
despite the stationary-looking residuals. For Belize, Finland (1946-1985), Japan and
the three countries under the Gold Standard, CCRs are low to moderately persistent,
but, considering the rather short sample, there is the possibility that Johansen’s tests’
failure to reject no cointegration is spurious. This is less of a possibility for Canada,
Ecuador and Spain, whose CCRs do not appear to be stationary: for these three
countries, it can therefore be stated with reasonable confidence that cointegration
truly is not in the data.
Based on the Selden-Latané specification results are overall very similar. Evidence
is mixed for Belize, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Guatemala, Spain, the
United States based on the Lucas-Nicolini aggregate, for the period since 1914;
and for Denmark and the United States during the Gold Standard. The estimated
persistence of CCRs, and their stationarity appearance, suggest that cointegration
might be possible for Belize, Colombia, Denmark (1923-2011), Guatemala, and the
United States under both periods, and Denmark under the Gold Standard. On the
other hand, this is less likely to be the case for Canada, Ecuador and Spain.
Finally, based on the log-log specification Johansen’s and Shin’s tests produce
conflicting evidence in 22 cases. In contrast to Benati et al. (2018), who find that,
for M1, the log-log specification works well for several countries—first and foremost,
high-inflation ones such as Argentina and Israel—for M2 this specification does not
seem to work for any country. The strong look of non-stationarity of most of the
CCRs in figures B.3 and B.4 further adds to this impression: this is especially clear
for Argentina, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Portugal, South
Africa, Spain, Sweden, the United States and Taiwan, and for the United States
under the Gold Standard. In all of these cases it is therefore reasonable to argue that
22
Johansen’s tests have correctly captured the lack of cointegration.
6.1.3 Cases in which the evidence is against cointegration
Based on the semi-log specification, for nine countries both cointegration tests
point towards no cointegration, with Johansen’s tests not rejecting the null of no
cointegration, and Shin’s tests instead rejecting the null of cointegration. This is the
case for the United States (1915-2014),37 Chile (1941-1995), Finland (1914-1985),
Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Portugal (1914-1998), South Africa, and Sweden
(1914-2010). In order to assess whether these results might still be compatible with
the presence of cointegration, I next examine the CCRs in figures B.1 and B.2. For
Chile, Finland, Jordan, Portugal, and Sweden, they clearly appear non-stationary.
For Finland, Jordan, Portugal, and Sweden, ρ̂MUB is indeed very high, ranging
between 0.93 and 0.98, and with the 90 percent confidence intervals stretching up to
1.01 in all four cases. For Chile persistence is somewhat lower, with ρ̂MUB being equal
to 0.68. Taken together with the visual evidence discussed in section 2.2, absence
of cointegration is a reasonable interpretation of the overall evidence. For Malaysia,
the Netherlands, South Africa and the United States, on the other hand, the CCRs
appear broadly stationary. At the same time, they appear to be highly persistent,
with estimated ρ̂MUB’s being equal to 0.67, 0.69, 0.85 and 0.9, respectively. For
Malaysia, the Netherlands and South Africa, the short sample periods, together with
the comparatively high persistence of the CCRs, suggest that results from Johansen’s
tests are not incompatible with the presence of cointegration. In these three cases it
is therefore not clear whether statistical tests have captured the truth, or whether
there might indeed be cointegration in the data. A similar argument can be made for
the United States. Although the sample period is comparatively longer, the relatively
high persistence of the CCR, with ρ̂MUB = 0.9, makes it hard for Johansen’s tests to
detect cointegration. The overall evidence for the United States is thus not entirely
incompatible with the presence of cointegration.
Again, results based on the Selden-Latané specification are very similar to those
produced by the semi-log one. In particular, for Finland (1914-1985), Malaysia,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the United States both Johansen’s and
Shin’s tests indicate absence of cointegration. For South Africa, on the other hand,
Johansen’s tests produce contrasting evidence. Together with the stationary-looking
37These results refer to the Friedman-Schwartz M2 aggregate. For the Lucas-Nicolini aggregate
the results are different in that Shin’s test cannot reject cointegration. Given the previously
discussed lower extent of informativeness of Shin’s tests, these result should however be discounted.
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CCR in figure B.6, this provides some weak evidence in favor of cointegration.
For Jordan, based on the Selden-Latané specification, Shin’s test also indicates no
cointegration, whereas Johansen’s tests are in favor of cointegration. The clearly
non-stationary-looking cointegration residual in figure B.6, however, casts doubt on
the whether cointegration truly is in the data.
Finally, based on the log-log specification, Johansen’s and Shin’s tests both point
towards no cointegration for Denmark and Sweden under the Gold Standard, and
for Canada, Chile, Jordan, Lebanon and Malaysia for the period since 1914. Indeed,
for Canada, Chile and Jordan the CCRs, shown in figures B.3 and B.4, do not look
stationary, and they all exhibit high persistence, with the 90 percent confidence
interval for ρ̂MUB stretching up to 1.01 in all three cases. Overall, it is thus
reasonable to interpret the entire body of evidence as pointing towards absence of
cointegration. For Denmark and Sweden under the Gold Standard and for Lebanon
evidence is less clear-cut. In those three cases the CCRs look borderline stationary
(see Figures B.3 and B.4, respectively). The rather short sample periods and the
non-negligible persistence in the CCRs make it hard for Johansen’s tests to detect
cointegration. In these cases evidence thus is not entirely incompatible with the
presence of cointegration.
6.2 Unrestricted specifications
The results produced by unrestricted specifications are reported in tables 2 and 3,
whereas the corresponding CCRs are shown in Figures B.7 and B.8. Table 2 reports
results from cointegration tests based on unrestricted specifications featuring the
logarithms of nominal M2 and nominal GDP, and either the logarithm of the short
rate (for high-inflation countries), or its level (for all other countries). As previously
mentioned, in several cases it is not possible to estimate these specifications because
for at least one series the order of integration is greater than one. Table 3 reports
results from cointegration tests based on unrestricted specifications featuring the
logarithms of real M2 and real GDP, and either the logarithm of the short rate (for
high-inflation countries), or its level (for all other countries).
6.2.1 Evidence in favor of cointegration
Based on the nominal specification evidence points towards cointegration for Finland
(1946-1985) and Norway (1946-2013). Based on the real specification both Johansen’s
and Shin’s tests provide evidence of cointegration for Korea and for the United States
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Table 1: Cointegration tests: Johansen’s and Shin’s test statistics for all specifications based
on M2 velocity and the short-term interest rate
Semi-log specification Log-log specification Selden-Latané specification
Johansen’s tests Shin’s tests Johansen’s tests Shin’s tests Johansen’s tests Shin’s tests
Country Period Trace test Max. eig. Trace test Max. eig. Trace test Max. eig.
Argentina 1914-1984 12.120 (0.254) 9.773 (0.304) 0.463 (0.297)
Brazil 1934-2012 8.332 (0.611) 6.693 (0.641) 0.384 (0.330)
Belize 1977-2014 12.148 (0.294) 11.555 (0.209) 0.266 (0.159) 14.828 (0.157) 13.052 (0.132) 0.226 (0.148)
Canada 1926-2006 12.444 (0.321) 8.293 (0.499) 0.253 (0.547) 15.667 (0.152) 12.672 (0.161) 1.568 (0.029) 11.802 (0.357) 7.650 (0.560) 0.270 (0.534)
Chile 1941-1995 10.167 (0.476) 7.812 (0.522) 0.988 (0.011) 7.978 (0.708) 6.311 (0.726) 0.751 (0.079)
Colombia 1959-2009 6.534 (0.750) 6.351 (0.670) 0.433 (0.490) 9.761 (0.424) 9.002 (0.383) 0.158 (0.324) 7.621 (0.636) 6.566 (0.645) 0.442 (0.454)
Denmark 1875-1913 15.716 (0.131) 10.797 (0.281) 0.318 (0.268) 14.415 (0.177) 9.860 (0.355) 0.348 (0.043) 15.998 (0.129) 9.822 (0.370) 0.321 (0.217)
1923-2011 12.358 (0.334) 10.315 (0.312) 0.721 (0.116) 11.310 (0.396) 10.972 (0.260) 0.343 (0.457) 12.273 (0.340) 10.000 (0.344) 0.687 (0.141)
Ecuador 1965-2011 5.349 (0.877) 4.306 (0.897) 0.591 (0.165) 6.878 (0.753) 5.740 (0.761) 0.265 (0.346) 8.440 (0.643) 4.297 (0.917) 0.370 (0.211)
Finland 1914-1985 9.259 (0.553) 5.667 (0.777) 1.369 (0.042) 9.555 (0.536) 5.797 (0.770) 0.461 (0.245) 8.159 (0.661) 4.440 (0.895) 1.448 (0.041)
1946-1985 13.842 (0.253) 13.681 (0.146) 0.124 (0.188) 21.812 (0.035) 19.162 (0.032) 0.129 (0.225)
Germany 1876-1913 14.703 (0.147) 13.377 (0.136) 0.639 (0.204) 13.836 (0.175) 12.411 (0.172) 0.121 (0.124) 16.202 (0.156) 11.890 (0.270) 0.640 (0.159)
1960-1989 17.206 (0.145) 16.890 (0.077) 0.425 (0.184) 17.670 (0.130) 17.370 (0.067) 0.049 (0.709) 17.761 (0.131) 17.133 (0.074) 0.400 (0.217)
Guatemala 1980-2012 13.906 (0.330) 11.142 (0.355) 0.148 (0.284) 13.953 (0.248) 10.228 (0.347) 0.088 (0.678) 14.085 (0.308) 11.340 (0.335) 0.148 (0.298)
Israel 1983-2013 166.062 (0.000) 163.862 (0.000) 0.134 (0.404) 11.796 (0.454) 9.573 (0.505) 0.176 (0.104)
Italy 1861-1913 19.599 (0.046) 14.904 (0.083) 0.249 (0.245) 17.373 (0.085) 13.100 (0.137) 0.573 (0.069)
Japan 1955-2013 11.603 (0.289) 11.422 (0.215) 0.408 (0.141) 6.195 (0.782) 6.189 (0.695) 0.293 (0.101)
Jordan 1965-2015 12.258 (0.296) 8.292 (0.502) 1.299 (0.015) 12.357 (0.262) 8.246 (0.466) 0.298 (0.069) 28.714 (0.002) 24.515 (0.004) 1.266 (0.012)
Korea 1960-2014 30.723 (0.002) 27.195 (0.002) 0.332 (0.250) 12.814 (0.229) 10.089 (0.303) 0.170 (0.330) 60.709 (0.000) 45.390 (0.001) 0.093 (0.820)
Lebanon 1977-2014 17.831 (0.156) 14.222 (0.173) 0.151 (0.262) 16.827 (0.196) 13.124 (0.231) 0.921 (0.008) 19.479 (0.083) 15.650 (0.096) 0.141 (0.229)
Malaysia 1980-2012 9.843 (0.448) 9.093 (0.406) 0.556 (0.070) 9.668 (0.476) 8.911 (0.434) 0.164 (0.096) 11.090 (0.390) 8.596 (0.474) 0.560 (0.065)
Mexico 1985-2014 27.628 (0.009) 27.553 (0.006) 0.185 (0.314) 11.024 (0.447) 11.021 (0.337) 0.111 (0.193) 28.108 (0.009) 27.623 (0.006) 0.116 (0.640)
Netherlands 1957-1992 11.522 (0.474) 10.556 (0.395) 0.619 (0.001) 13.317 (0.339) 12.297 (0.264) 0.101 (0.275) 11.311 (0.486) 10.790 (0.369) 0.613 (0.004)
Peru 1960-2014 9.386 (0.532) 8.701 (0.431) 0.464 (0.115)
Paraguay 1962-2014 21.367 (0.030) 17.475 (0.038) 0.259 (0.426) 21.287 (0.035) 16.187 (0.062) 0.241 (0.425)
Portugal 1914-1998 8.137 (0.653) 4.219 (0.916) 2.525 (0.011) 6.431 (0.828) 4.086 (0.933) 1.033 (0.174) 8.558 (0.636) 4.915 (0.869) 2.471 (0.005)
South Africa 1967-2014 14.387 (0.239) 13.118 (0.180) 0.641 (0.043) 15.642 (0.141) 15.421 (0.070) 0.234 (0.269) 16.620 (0.131) 15.364 (0.085) 0.631 (0.022)
Spain 1946-1997 9.391 (0.568) 7.041 (0.628) 0.422 (0.231) 8.419 (0.665) 6.175 (0.738) 0.617 (0.082) 9.177 (0.586) 6.928 (0.642) 0.420 (0.230)
Sweden 1871-1913 11.131 (0.395) 10.443 (0.344) 0.691 (0.210) 11.168 (0.395) 10.462 (0.344) 0.171 (0.088) 10.755 (0.420) 8.474 (0.447) 2.203 (0.010)
1914-2010 9.921 (0.500) 7.549 (0.555) 2.189 (0.011) 4.884 (0.919) 4.797 (0.851) 0.333 (0.560)
Taiwan 1962-2014 20.774 (0.021) 15.719 (0.056) 0.357 (0.164) 13.506 (0.169) 8.617 (0.402) 0.215 (0.140)
United States 1869-1913 12.673 (0.218) 12.480 (0.147) 0.173 (0.915) 13.973 (0.170) 13.697 (0.109) 0.044 (0.874) 14.669 (0.151) 13.605 (0.117) 0.161 (0.887)
FS M2 1915-2014 12.794 (0.280) 8.195 (0.485) 1.636 (0.022) 7.247 (0.733) 5.344 (0.801) 0.392 (0.538) 11.274 (0.387) 7.244 (0.589) 1.765 (0.024)
LN M2 1915-2014 11.794 (0.333) 7.582 (0.548) 0.408 (0.426) 7.559 (0.699) 6.989 (0.612) 0.549 (0.290) 13.570 (0.217) 8.184 (0.472) 0.432 (0.397)
Note: Bootstrapped p-values (in parentheses) are based on 10,000 bootstrap replications.
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under the Gold Standard. Based on the nominal specification,38 however, Johansen’s
tests produce contrasting results for the United States under the Gold Standard,
with the maximum eigenvalue test pointing towards cointegration, and the trace
test being instead marginally insignificant (with a p-value of 0.105). Shin’s test also
points towards no cointegration. The CCR, however, appears stationary and thus
suggests that a cointegration relationship still might be there.
6.2.2 Evidence against cointegration
Based on the nominal specification, for Denmark (1923-2011) evidence from statistical
tests clearly speaks against cointegration, and the strong look of non-stationarity of
the CCRs only confirms this. Based on the real specification Shin’s test is not able to
reject the null of cointegration for Denmark, however, the CCRs look non-stationary
as in the nominal specification which confirms the result based on the nominal
specification. For Canada and Chile (1915-1995), for which cointegration could only
be tested based on the real specification, all tests point towards no cointegration, a
result which is validated by the look of non-stationarity of the CCRs.
6.2.3 Conflicting evidence
Based on the nominal specification, for Ecuador, Finland (1914-1985), Portugal
(1914-1998), Sweden (1914-2010) and the United States (1915-2014), and Italy and
Sweden under the Gold Standard, Johansen’s and Shin’s test produce contrasting
evidence. For Finland, the United States, and Italy and Sweden under the Gold
Standard, CCRs appear as stationary, although in the three former cases they are
very highly persistent. Thus, cointegration might be in the data but Johansen’s
tests might not be able to detect it. The high estimates of ρ̂MUB for Finland and
the United States for the period since 1914, and the comparatively short sample
period for Italy and Sweden under the Gold Standard are also compatible with this
position. For Ecuador, Portugal and Sweden (1914-2010) it appears as less likely
that a cointegration relationship exists, since the CCRs appear as non-stationary.
Mixed evidence also results for South Africa, and for the United States under the
Gold Standard. Although for South Africa both Johansen’s trace test and Shin’s test
point towards cointegration, the null of no cointegration cannot be rejected based on
the maximum eigenvalue test. Further, the rather stationary-looking CCR suggests
38For Korea cointegration tests could not be performed based on the unrestricted nominal
specification.
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that cointegration might be there.
Based on the real specification, for Israel the maximum eigenvalue test and Shin’s test
point towards cointegration, whereas the trace test is instead marginally insignificant
(with a p-value of 0.107). For Denmark under the Gold Standard, Shin’s test and
the trace test provide evidence of cointegration, whereas the maximum eigenvalue
test cannot reject the null of no cointegration.
Table 2: Cointegration tests: Johansen’s and Shin’s test statistics for the logarithm of
nominal M2, nominal GDP and the short-term interest rate
I: Johansen’s tests II: Shin’s tests
Trace tests Maximum eigenvalue tests
Country Period 0 versus 1 1 versus 2
Belize 1977-2014 39.270 (0.040) 27.794 (0.043) 7.829 (0.532) 0.148 (0.057)
Denmark 1923-2011 22.341 (0.547) 14.693 (0.529) 5.442 (0.832) 0.249 (0.068)
Ecuador 1965-2011 10.974 (0.991) 6.951 (0.986) 3.879 (0.934) 0.087 (0.355)
Finland 1914-1985 16.588 (0.871) 10.994 (0.827) 4.987 (0.829) 0.031 (0.998)
1946-1985 44.643 (0.023) 29.343 (0.042) 14.884 (0.138) 0.043 (0.663)
Italy 1861-1913 24.653 (0.355) 16.878 (0.322) 6.868 (0.578) 0.098 (0.488)
Norway 1946-2013 42.381 (0.008) 29.500 (0.013) 11.224 (0.176) 0.077 (0.638)
Portugal 1914-1998 18.728 (0.799) 9.795 (0.921) 7.402 (0.613) 0.156 (0.385)
South Africa 1967-2014 41.060 (0.044) 22.833 (0.167) 9.900 (0.425) 0.040 (0.847)
Sweden 1871-1913 28.593 (0.338) 20.025 (0.280) 8.490 (0.501) 0.097 (0.419)
1914-2010 14.170 (0.915) 9.026 (0.903) 4.259 (0.874) 0.178 (0.455)
United States 1869-1913 32.439 (0.105) 22.816 (0.092) 9.570 (0.354) 0.175 (0.013)
Friedman-Schwartz M2 1915-2014 13.522 (0.935) 9.331 (0.884) 3.624 (0.938) 0.116 (0.782)
Lucas-Nicolini M2 1915-2014 16.777 (0.797) 10.218 (0.828) 6.298 (0.667) 0.296 (0.198)
Note: Test statistics are from the regression ln(M2,t) =β0 + β1ln(NGDPt) + β2Rt + ut, where M2,t =
nominal M2; NGDPt = nominal GDP; Rt = short rate. The bootstrapped p-values (in parentheses) are
based on 10,000 bootstrap replications of the VECM estimated under the null hypothesis of one cointegration
vector.
6.3 Discussion of the evidence
Overall, only in very few cases do statistical tests provide strong evidence of a stable
demand for M2. In particular, Finland (1946-1985), Korea, Mexico and Paraguay
are the only countries for which all tests consistently point towards cointegration
based on more than one money demand specification. Specifically, for Finland this
is the case based on the Selden-Latané and the unrestricted nominal specification.
Based on the semi-log specification the results of the cointegration tests are mixed.
For Korea cointegration tests consistently point towards cointegration based on the
semi-log, the Selden-Latané, and the unrestricted real specification, whereas the
only specification producing mixed evidence is the log-log. As discussed above, the
log-log specification does not appear to work well for any country in the dataset.
For Mexico and Paraguay a cointegration relation is found based on the semi-log
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Table 3: Cointegration tests: Johansen’s and Shin’s test statistics for the logarithm of real
M2, real GDP and the short-term interest rate
I: Johansen’s tests II: Shin’s tests
Trace tests Maximum eigenvalue tests
Country Period 0 versus 1 1 versus 2
Canada 1926-2006 15.445 (0.885) 9.490 (0.895) 5.930 (0.725) 0.257 (0.180)
Chile* 1915-1995 20.676 (0.541) 13.943 (0.501) 5.661 (0.759) 0.402 (0.015)
Colombia 1959-2009 25.653 (0.322) 16.175 (0.385) 7.402 (0.627) 0.043 (0.776)
Denmark 1875-1913 34.903 (0.079) 21.429 (0.155) 13.467 (0.105) 0.053 (0.696)
1923-2011 16.968 (0.797) 11.596 (0.725) 3.620 (0.938) 0.177 (0.282)
Finland 1946-1985 45.656 (0.007) 28.323 (0.028) 13.596 (0.117) 0.093 (0.162)
Israel* 1983-2013 42.045 (0.107) 36.348 (0.025) 5.165 (0.898) 0.027 (0.959)
Italy 1861-1913 37.153 (0.054) 22.931 (0.114) 14.155 (0.091) 0.178 (0.092)
Korea 1960-2014 46.983 (0.009) 22.851 (0.100) 13.812 (0.102) 0.079 (0.746)
Portugal 1914-1998 24.767 (0.345) 14.481 (0.498) 8.129 (0.441) 0.196 (0.293)
South Africa 1967-2014 33.714 (0.145) 21.000 (0.222) 12.681 (0.236) 0.091 (0.230)
Spain 1946-1997 14.863 (0.914) 10.153 (0.859) 3.920 (0.930) 0.071 (0.606)
Sweden 1871-1913 34.313 (0.122) 23.069 (0.142) 9.617 (0.398) 0.061 (0.536)
Sweden 1914-2010 12.694 (0.950) 9.420 (0.859) 3.236 (0.954) 0.246 (0.225)
United States 1869-1913 48.387 (0.006) 32.365 (0.014) 12.405 (0.209) 0.054 (0.713)
Friedman-Schwartz M2 1915-2013 15.262 (0.874) 10.380 (0.821) 4.019 (0.897) 0.176 (0.424)
Lucas-Nicolini M2 1915-2013 19.326 (0.645) 10.871 (0.785) 7.642 (0.465) 0.330 (0.107)
Venezuela* 1962-1998 19.397 (0.771) 11.594 (0.817) 7.598 (0.589) 0.043 (0.745)
Note: Test statistics are from the regression ln(M2,t) =β0 + β1ln(RGDPt) + β2Rt + ut, where M2,t = real
M2; RGDPt = real GDP; Rt = short rate. The bootstrapped p-values (in parentheses) are based on 10,000
bootstrap replications of the VECM estimated under the null hypothesis of one cointegration vector.
* Short rate is in logarithm.
and the Selden-Latané specification. Based on the log-log specification the evidence
is mixed for Mexico. For Paraguay cointegration tests could not be conducted
based on the log-log specification. For Taiwan, cointegration tests could only be
conducted based on the semi-log and the log-log specification, and only based on
the semi-log do they produce evidence of cointegration. For Norway cointegration
could be tested based on only one specification, which is the unrestricted nominal
specification. Based on this specification a cointegrating relation is detected. For
Israel and Lebanon, and for Italy and the United States under the Gold Standard, at
least one money demand specification produces evidence of cointegration. For Israel,
cointegration is detected based on the semi-log specification, whereas weak evidence
of cointegration is produced by the trivariate real specification. Mixed evidence
exists based on the log-log specification. For the other two countries, evidence is
mixed across the alternative specifications. For example, for Lebanon evidence is in
favor of cointegration based on the Selden-Latané specification, whereas the semi-log
specification produces mixed results and the log-log specification produces evidence
against cointegration.
On the other hand, evidence against cointegration is strong for Canada, Chile (1941-
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1995), Finland (1914-1985), Jordan, Portugal, and Sweden. For all these cases both
Johansen’s and Shin’s tests point towards no cointegration based on more than
one specification, and the CCRs clearly appear as non-stationary. For Malaysia,
the Netherlands and the United States (1915-2014), the tests also uniformly point
towards no cointegration based on the semi-log and the Selden-Latané specification.
For Malaysia, also the log-log specification points towards no cointegration. However,
the cointegration residuals do rather seem to be stationary. Therefore, we cannot be
entirely sure that there truly is no cointegration relation in the data.
6.4 Possible explanations for the instability of M2 demand
The evidence discussed above shows that it is almost impossible to detect a stable
demand for M2. Although M2 may better internalize portfolio shifts between M1
and the non-M1 M2 components, for a majority of countries in the dataset, long-run
demand for M2 is unstable. For M1, on the other hand, Benati et al. (2018) detect a
stable long-run demand in many countries. In this section, I discuss possible reasons
for the instability in the long-run demand for M2. The fact that the M1-part of M2
exhibits a stable long-run demand implies that the instability of M2 has to come from
the non-M1 component of M2.
39 While the components of the narrow M1 aggregate
mostly fulfill the role of a medium of exchange to facilitate transactions, the non-M1
components of M2 rather have the role of an asset. Further, the non-M1 components
usually pay interest, whereas the M1 components, i.e. currency and demand deposits,
do not.
In the literature a number of different explanations for the instability in the demand
for money have been discussed. One strand of the literature has proposed the
so-called institutional approach which has been revisited by Bordo and Jonung (1990,
1997, 2009) and Siklos (1993). This approach emphasizes financial development and
institutional changes within the economy as a major influence on money velocity.
Bordo and Jonung have observed that money velocity behaves differently across
countries depending on their stage of financial and economic development. Stressing
the role of M2 as an asset, they discuss two different processes, besides movements in
the interest rate, that are responsible for driving the behavior of velocity. The first
process is financial deepening and the second one is financial innovation - especially
the creation of money substitutes. In addition, they stress the influence of improved
economic stability.
39i.e. savings deposits and, for some countries, time deposits.
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Financial deepening
Financial deepening is the first stage of the financial development process. With
the development of financial institutions and the growth of the financial sector more
people get access to financial services. Through the rise of a commercial banking
system that supplies notes and deposit facilities to the public the use of money
for settling transactions grows. These developments promote a more rapid growth
in the demand for money than in nominal income and thus cause money velocity
to fall. Bordo and Jonung explain the downward trend in money velocity for the
industrialized countries until the interwar period (see figure 3) with this process of
monetization. For industrialized countries, such as Canada and the United States or
Denmark, Sweden and Norway, financial deepening essentially ended around World
War I. For several other countries in the dataset, a downward trend in M2 velocity
can be observed until recently, indicating that the process of financial deepening
started later and only ended recently. For example, for developing countries such as
Colombia, Ecuador, Jordan, Malaysia, South Africa and Venezuela M2 velocity keeps
decreasing until lately, while the interest rate starts increasing during the 1980s. But
also for some developed countries, such as Italy, Portugal and Spain, the process of
financial deepening took longer, with velocity exhibiting a downward trend until the
1970s.
Financial innovation
The second stage of financial development is increasing financial sophistication
due to financial innovation. Financial innovation is a popular explanation for the
postwar rise in money velocity that can be observed for most industrialized countries.
Financial sophistication has emerged twofold. On the one hand, a large number of
new financial instruments have emerged that act as close substitutes for money, such
as stocks, bonds, and other financial assets. These money substitutes may satisfy
asset motives previously met by deposits, and thus reduce demand for money as an
asset at any given interest rate, shifting the velocity curve upward. On the other
hand, various methods of economizing on money balances, such as the use of credit
cards or electronic cash management techniques have facilitated transactions. These
modern money transfer methods reduce the transactions demand for money and
cause a rise in money velocity.
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Economic stability
Improved economic security and stability are other factors causing velocity to rise.
Economic security provided by a modern welfare state, such as unemployment bene-
fits, public insurance schemes, and pension systems reduce the need of holding money
as a store of value for cases of financial straits. Improved economic stability as a
consequence of macroeconomic policies aimed at maintaining maximum employment
and an environment of price stability further reduces demand for money.
The institutional approach suggests that additional explanatory variables to the
standard determinants of velocity used in the money demand literature are needed
to explain the behavior of money velocity. Siklos (1993) has tested the institutional
hypothesis for five industrialized countries since the end of the 19th century up to
the mid-1980s using cointegration methods. He includes a number of different proxy
variables in the money demand equation to account for financial innovation, eco-
nomic stability, and the process of monetization. For all countries, except the United
States,40 he has only found a stable long-run M2 demand once the institutional
variables are added to the money demand equation.
More recently, studies focusing on the United States since WWII have modeled
financial innovation through the use of time trends or dummy and shift variables. In
the early nineties M2 growth began to slow down despite a considerable reduction in
the interest rate. This change in the relationship between M2 velocity and interest
rates has given rise to different explanations as to the causes of this change. A widely
stated cause of the shift in M2 velocity has been attributed to the development of
bond and stock mutual funds (Darin and Hetzel, 1994; Mehra, 1997; Duca, 2000;
Duca and VanHoose, 2004). Bond and stock funds have facilitated accessibility to
stocks and bonds for the public. They have reduced transaction costs of switching
between M2 and securities not included in M2, leading to a higher substitutability
between M2 and stock and bond funds.
41 Some papers have modeled financial
innovation using shift dummies, for example in the form of a broken linear trend. By
adding these ad-hoc explanatory variables, stability of M2 demand could be restored,
indicating that the causes discussed above are reasonable explanations for the recent
instability in U.S. broad money demand.
40For the United States, he has found a stable demand for M2 using the traditional money
demand equation.
41Another related explanation for the instability in U.S. M2 demand is the poor financial
condition of U.S. depository institutions, especially thrift institutions, in the early 1990s (Lown
et al., 2006; Carlson et al., 2000), leading to the development of mutual funds.
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Other attempts to restore stability in long-run M2 demand aimed at adjusting M2.
Financial innovation caused money substitutes to become more attractive. This has
led many authors to propose a change of the M2 definition. For example, it was
suggested to exclude small-denomination time deposits from M2 (Carlson et al., 2000;
Lown et al., 2006), or to include money substitutes, such as stock and bond mutual
funds (Orphanides et al., 1994; Darin and Hetzel, 1994). However, these adjustments
have only worked temporarily, and the additional components have been subject to
new problems.42
7 Conclusion
This paper has reexamined one of the central questions in macroeconomic research
over the past decades: is there a stable long-run money demand? I used a novel
dataset on 32 countries to explore this question for the M2 aggregate. I analyzed
five money demand specifications, including three restricted specifications which
are based on money velocity and a short term nominal interest rate, and two
unrestricted specifications which feature nominal or real M2 and GDP and a short-
term nominal interest rate. I tested for the stability of money demand using two
different cointegration tests: Johansens’ tests and Shin’s test. Because the persistence
in the CCR plays a crucial role for the performance of the tests, all results have been
analyzed taking the estimated persistence into account.
The main result obtained from the analysis is the following. Evidence of cointegration
is hard to find in a majority of the cases. Based on the entire evidence, including the
persistence of the candidate cointegration residuals, the results clearly speak against
a stable money demand for Canada, Chile (1941-1995), Finland (1914-1985), Jordan,
Portugal, and Sweden. Only in five cases, Finland (1946-1985), Korea, Mexico,
Paraguay and Taiwan, is there strong evidence in favor of cointegration. Weak
evidence exists for Israel and Lebanon. For the remaining countries, the evidence is
mixed across specifications, or across the two tests and with regard to the evidence
from the cointegration residuals.
Further, the evidence suggests that the log-log specification does not work well as a
model of the long-run demand for M2 for any country in the dataset. In fact, it is
the only specification under consideration based on which the cointegration tests do
not produce consistent evidence in favor of cointegration for neither country.
42For example, Orphanides et al. (1994) noticed that adding stock and bond mutual funds makes
the new aggregate very sensitive to movements in bond and equity price.
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Comparing these results for M2 to results obtained by Benati et al. (2018) for M1, it
is clear that a stable long-run money demand relation is much harder to find for M2
than for M1. Therefore, if any monetary aggregate is to be used as an indicator for
nominal economic activity, the M1 aggregate is likely to be the better choice.
The different results for the two monetary aggregates prompt the question: what
causes these differences? Since the M1 aggregate is included in the M2 aggregate,
the instability in M2 demand arises from the non-M1 component of M2, i.e. M2-M1.
It is therefore important to split the broader aggregate into its stable part (M1) and
its unstable part (M2-M1) to understand the demand for money. This is what I am
pursuing in the next chapter of this dissertation.
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A Additional tables
Table A.1: Persistence of the candidate cointegration residuals for the bivariate money
demand specifications (median, and 90 percent bootstrapped confidence interval)
Money demand specification
Country Period Semi-log Log-log Selden-Latané
Argentina 1914-1984 1.01 [0.99;1.05]
Belize 1977-2014 0.71 [0.50;0.97] 0.70 [0.50;1.00]
Brazil 1934-2012 0.96 [0.87;1.02]
Canada 1926-2006 0.92 [0.85;1.01] 0.92 [0.84;1.00] 0.92 [0.85;1.01]
Chile 1941-1995 0.68 [0.53;0.84] 0.80 [0.62;1.02]
Colombia 1959-2009 0.88 [0.76;1.11] 0.86 [0.68;1.14] 0.87 [0.74;1.01]
Denmark 1923-2011 0.91 [0.85;0.98] 0.88 [0.82;0.96] 0.91 [0.85;0.98]
Ecuador 1965-2011 0.90 [0.75;1.02] 1.00 [0.94;1.03] 0.92 [0.75;1.02]
Finland 1914-1985 0.97 [0.92;1.01] 0.97 [0.93;1.01] 0.98 [0.88;1.02]
Finland 1946-1985 0.54 [0.30;0.83] 0.55 [0.31;0.81]
Germany 1960-1989 0.30 [-0.02;0.62] 0.27 [-0.04;0.59] 0.28 [-0.04;0.62]
Guatemala 1980-2012 0.82 [0.56;1.03] 0.76 [0.50;1.02] 0.83 [0.56;1.03]
Israel 1983-2013 0.36 [0.33;0.40] 0.75 [0.56;1.00]
Japan 1955-2013 0.63 [0.47;0.79] 0.87 [0.79;0.97]
Jordan 1965-2015 0.98 [0.93;1.01] 0.81 [0.67;1.01] 0.97 [0.92;1.00]
Korea 1960-2014 0.69 [0.55;0.84] 0.83 [0.72;0.97] 0.72 [0.58;0.87]
Lebanon 1977-2014 0.81 [0.66;1.01] 0.80 [0.64;0.99] 0.57 [0.35;0.80]
Malaysia 1980-2012 0.67 [0.44;0.99] 0.66 [0.40;0.99] 0.69 [0.47;0.99]
Mexico 1985-2014 0.67 [0.50;0.89] 0.58 [0.28;0.94] 0.63 [0.44;0.86]
Netherlands 1957-1992 0.69 [0.46;1.00] 0.75 [0.48;1.02] 0.69 [0.44;1.01]
Paraguay 1962-2014 0.78 [0.61;1.01] 0.78 [0.61;1.01]
Peru 1960-2014 0.78 [0.62;0.96]
Portugal 1914-1998 0.98 [0.93;1.01] 1.00 [0.96;1.02] 1.00 [0.95;1.02]
South Africa 1967-2014 0.85 [0.71;1.01] 0.86 [0.74;1.01] 0.85 [0.71;1.01]
Spain 1946-1997 0.86 [0.70;1.02] 0.92 [0.76;1.03] 0.85 [0.68;1.02]
Sweden 1914-2010 0.93 [0.86;1.01] 0.94 [0.87;1.01] 0.93 [0.86;1.01]
Taiwan 1962-2014 0.65 [0.48;0.83] 0.82 [0.69;0.97]
United States 1915-2014 0.90 [0.82;0.99] 0.94 [0.87;1.01] 0.91 [0.83;1.00]
Gold Standard Period
Denmark 1875-1913 0.76 [0.61;0.93] 0.79 [0.64;0.95] 0.80 [0.65;0.96]
Germany 1876-1913 0.38 [0.06;0.70] 0.42 [0.11;0.75] 0.81 [0.63;1.01]
Italy 1861-1913 0.78 [0.66;0.91] 0.81 [0.69;0.93]
Sweden 1871-1913 0.59 [0.41;0.78] 0.60 [0.41;0.79]
United States 1869-1913 0.49 [0.21;0.78] 0.40 [0.11;0.74] 0.48 [0.20;0.78]
Note: Hansen (1999) ‘grid bootstrap’ estimates of the sum of the autoregressive
coefficients based on AR(2) models are based on 2,000 bootstrap replications for
each value of ρ in the grid. Candidate cointegration residuals have been computed
based on the respective bivariate model and Johansen’s estimator.
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Table A.2: Persistence of the candidate cointegration residuals for the trivariate money
demand specifications (median, and 90 percent bootstrapped confidence interval)
Money demand specification
Country Period nominal real
Belize 1977-2014 0.34 [0.13;0.55]
Canada 1926-2006 0.92 [0.85;1.00]
Chile* 1941-1995 0.70 [0.60;0.80]
Colombia 1959-2009 0.95 [0.83;1.02]
Denmark 1923-2011 0.95 [0.90;1.01] 0.91 [0.85;0.98]
Ecuador 1965-2011 0.90 [0.77;1.02]
Finland 1914-1985 0.81 [0.69;0.94]
Finland 1946-1985 0.29 [0.01;0.58] 0.37 [0.13;0.63]
Israel 1983-2013 0.36 [0.33;0.40]
Korea 1960-2014 0.66 [0.52;0.79]
Norway 1946-2013 0.86 [0.79;0.94]
Portugal 1914-1998 0.99 [0.89;1.02] 0.91 [0.81;1.01]
South Africa 1967-2014 0.65 [0.48;0.83] 0.80 [0.66;0.99]
Spain 1946-1997 0.80 [0.63;1.01]
Sweden 1914-2010 0.91 [0.84;0.99] 0.91 [0.85;0.99]
United States 1915-2014 0.86 [0.78;0.95] 0.87 [0.79;0.96]
Venezuela 1962-1998 0.61 [0.34;0.92]
Gold Standard period
Denmark 1875-1913 0.42 [0.21;0.64]
Italy 1861-1913 0.78 [0.66;0.92] 0.69 [0.54;0.84]
Sweden 1871-1913 0.44 [0.24;0.65] 0.58 [0.33;0.82]
United States 1869-1913 0.31 [0.02;0.63] 0.10 [-0.22;0.40]
Note: Hansen (1999) ‘grid bootstrap’ estimates of the sum of
the autoregressive coefficients based on AR(2) models are based
on 2,000 bootstrap replications for each value of ρ in the grid.
Candidate cointegration residuals have been computed based on
the respective trivariate model and Johansen’s estimator.
∗Short rate in logarithms.
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Table A.3: Bootstrapped p-values for Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock unit root tests
Logarithm of:
nominal GDP nominal M2 real GDP real M2 M2 velocity short rate M2 velocity short rate
Country Period p=1 p=2 p=1 p=2 p=1 p=2 p=1 p=2 p=1 p=2 p=1 p=2 p=1 p=2 p=1 p=2
Argentina 1914-1984 0.851 0.999 0.990 0.701 0.791 0.792 1.000 0.999 0.775 0.780 0.999 0.999
Belize 1977-2014 0.238 0.510 0.677 0.723 0.764 0.732 0.948 0.990 0.670 0.643 0.857 0.847
Brazil 1934-2012 0.295 0.592 0.298 0.674 0.713 0.725 0.375 0.341 0.600 0.692 0.007 0.059
Canada 1926-2006 0.117 0.134 0.161 0.218 0.680 0.361 0.683 0.549 0.377 0.192 0.614 0.719 0.383 0.219 0.377 0.478
Chile 1941-1995 0.427 0.466 0.620 0.447 0.067 0.336 0.348 0.252 0.004 0.011 0.136 0.098
1915-1995 0.177 0.059 0.208 0.582 0.370 0.260 0.086 0.037
Colombia 1959-2009 0.970 0.950 0.954 0.961 0.392 0.627 0.831 0.697 0.757 0.641 0.457 0.496 0.602 0.456 0.435 0.280
Denmark 1923-2011 0.218 0.403 0.018 0.410 0.944 0.965 0.051 0.444 0.172 0.430 0.855 0.814 0.262 0.418 0.693 0.686
Ecuador 1965-2011 0.674 0.673 0.535 0.521 0.611 0.646 0.727 0.826 0.295 0.380 0.336 0.664
Finland 1914-1985 0.289 0.103 0.282 0.122 0.015 0.079 0.214 0.192 0.266 0.211 0.538 0.522 0.392 0.400 0.517 0.515
1946-1985 0.056 0.599 0.889 0.925 0.592 0.638 0.040 0.346 0.005 0.106 0.055 0.041 0.010 0.107 0.133 0.153
Germany 1960-1989 0.842 0.960 0.759 0.928 0.671 0.865 0.068 0.135 0.601 0.816 0.070 0.129
Guatemala 1980-2012 0.959 0.971 0.982 0.993 0.378 0.498 0.641 0.578 0.380 0.493 0.610 0.591
Israel 1983-2013 0.001 0.161 0.002 0.006 0.871 0.854 0.257 0.005 0.079 0.000 0.183 0.011 0.063 0.000 0.120 0.000
Italy 1948-1998 0.780 0.891 0.972 0.976 0.096 0.636 0.099 0.954 0.141 0.665 0.860 0.901 0.019 0.548 0.808 0.839
Japan 1955-2013 0.212 0.720 0.171 0.772 0.055 0.330 0.014 0.261 0.289 0.448 0.728 0.772 0.012 0.044 0.598 0.580
Jordan 1965-2015 0.735 0.538 0.365 0.717 0.023 0.105 0.294 0.171 0.006 0.019 0.413 0.231
Korea 1960-2014 0.273 0.706 0.353 0.877 0.967 0.977 0.832 0.899 0.275 0.276 0.900 0.903 0.087 0.176 0.621 0.525
Lebanon 1977-2014 0.857 0.898 0.905 0.965 0.332 0.295 0.530 0.486 0.200 0.347 0.587 0.648
Malaysia 1980-2012 0.458 0.533 0.710 0.358 0.263 0.368 0.376 0.384 0.070 0.162 0.340 0.318
Mexico 1985-2014 0.014 0.019 0.049 0.005 0.969 0.666 0.628 0.286 0.918 0.491 0.344 0.026
Morocco 1985-2008 0.301 0.255 0.349 0.634 0.731 0.476 0.863 0.739 0.103 0.021 0.893 0.766
Netherlands 1957-1992 0.979 0.942 0.927 0.847 0.769 0.650 0.803 0.759 0.972 0.982 0.271 0.195 0.961 0.958 0.260 0.169
Norway 1946-2013 0.972 0.989 0.584 0.666 0.106 0.992 0.099 0.048 0.009 0.027 0.503 0.550 0.039 0.079 0.597 0.612
Paraguay 1962-2014 0.820 0.889 0.915 0.780 0.248 0.272 0.028 0.057 0.095 0.184 0.114 0.239
Peru 1960-2014 0.699 0.840 0.697 0.774 0.584 0.603 0.505 0.573 0.396 0.457 0.013 0.020
Portugal 1914-1998 0.635 0.610 0.422 0.330 0.236 0.241 0.300 0.221 0.572 0.473 0.725 0.712 0.594 0.455 0.596 0.468
South Africa 1967-2014 0.985 0.988 0.985 0.982 0.480 0.712 0.508 0.424 0.774 0.873 0.381 0.464 0.755 0.873 0.309 0.331
Spain 1946-1997 0.990 0.980 0.998 0.997 0.984 0.971 0.987 0.978 0.655 0.623 0.639 0.746 0.646 0.643 0.399 0.594
Sweden 1914-2010 0.716 0.742 0.605 0.530 0.914 0.937 0.515 0.556 0.330 0.503 0.745 0.811 0.417 0.546 0.475 0.627
Taiwan 1962-2014 0.438 0.798 0.470 0.852 0.198 0.765 0.562 0.881 0.052 0.107 0.598 0.660 0.001 0.003 0.409 0.507
Turkey 1977-2014 0.958 0.828 0.993 0.906 0.965 0.925 0.577 0.614 0.911 0.864 0.684 0.703
United States 1915-2014 0.679 0.353 0.544 0.233 0.487 0.210 0.399 0.316 0.367 0.296 0.627 0.482 0.413 0.354 0.316 0.317
Venezuela 1962-1998 0.668 0.785 0.434 0.671 0.174 0.399 0.888 0.913 0.569 0.563 0.820 0.786 0.392 0.372 0.786 0.785
Gold Standard period
Canada 1873-1907 0.501 0.650 0.265 0.228 0.601 0.524 0.314 0.067 0.420 0.601 0.006 0.157 0.221 0.477 0.005 0.131
Denmark 1875-1913 0.129 0.205 0.097 0.027 0.147 0.116 0.762 0.562 0.167 0.122 0.416 0.268 0.134 0.080 0.374 0.264
Finland 1867-1913 0.788 0.828 0.477 0.575 0.228 0.509 0.323 0.431 0.286 0.275 0.096 0.043 0.036 0.039 0.079 0.048
Germany 1876-1913 0.111 0.891 0.038 0.292 0.509 0.132 0.126 0.233 0.179 0.022 0.145 0.255
Italy 1861-1913 0.954 0.994 0.283 0.699 0.816 0.946 0.093 0.712 0.024 0.045 0.761 0.797 0.009 0.021 0.756 0.788
Norway 1830-1913 0.467 0.383 0.413 0.355 0.218 0.257 0.020 0.045 0.602 0.441 0.014 0.005 0.155 0.039 0.011 0.006
Spain 1874-1913 0.957 0.949 0.385 0.252 0.310 0.456 0.526 0.607 0.618 0.618 0.055 0.021 0.655 0.655 0.057 0.019
Sweden 1871-1913 0.930 0.918 0.337 0.749 0.950 0.911 0.065 0.565 0.033 0.258 0.118 0.028 0.001 0.084 0.112 0.027
United States 1869-1913 0.271 0.403 0.403 0.333 0.598 0.518 0.248 0.432 0.302 0.460 0.038 0.234 0.125 0.250 0.018 0.214
Note: Based on 10,000 bootstrap replications of estimated ARIMA processes. Tests are with an intercept and a time trend for the logarithms of
nominal and real GDP and nominal and real M2, and with an intercept and no time trend for the other series.
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Table A.4: Bootstrapped p-values for Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock unit root tests for the
variables in log- and first-differences
Log-difference of: First-difference of:
nominal GDP nominal M2 real GDP real M2 M2 velocity short rate M2 velocity short rate
Country Period p=1 p=2 p=1 p=2 p=1 p=2 p=1 p=2 p=1 p=2 p=1 p=2 p=1 p=2 p=1 p=2
Argentina 1914-1984 0.872 0.920 0.934 0.944 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.038 0.475
Brazil 1934-2012 0.136 0.206 0.128 0.209 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Belize 1977-2014 0.007 0.037 0.021 0.029 0.003 0.007 0.726 0.725 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.009
Canada 1926-2006 0.004 0.002 0.051 0.130 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1941-1995 0.171 0.079 0.006 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.004
Chile 1915-1995 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Colombia 1959-2009 0.638 0.855 0.236 0.615 0.037 0.056 0.005 0.045 0.002 0.035 0.001 0.007 0.000 0.018 0.009 0.014
Denmark 1923-2011 0.005 0.034 0.012 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Ecuador 1965-2011 0.006 0.035 0.002 0.009 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.017 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.006
Finland 1914-1985 0.013 0.048 0.010 0.009 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.002
1946-1985 0.005 0.033 0.010 0.032 0.001 0.017 0.002 0.010 0.002 0.013 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.014 0.001 0.002
Germany 1960-1989 0.098 0.247 0.047 0.073 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.078 0.009 0.007 0.004 0.051
Guatemala 1980-2012 0.076 0.133 0.017 0.105 0.004 0.027 0.002 0.057 0.004 0.028 0.002 0.098
Israel 1983-2013 0.013 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.015 0.044 0.007 0.010 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.023 0.004 0.000 0.016 0.053
Italy 1948-1998 0.203 0.569 0.321 0.712 0.097 0.195 0.018 0.451 0.002 0.152 0.002 0.127 0.000 0.254 0.001 0.031
Japan 1955-2013 0.510 0.737 0.513 0.595 0.181 0.515 0.037 0.201 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.011 0.000 0.000
Jordan 1965-2015 0.005 0.057 0.211 0.175 0.000 0.009 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.057 0.001 0.002
Korea 1960-2014 0.425 0.663 0.190 0.158 0.015 0.099 0.007 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.004
Lebanon 1977-2014 0.117 0.141 0.117 0.390 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.053 0.000 0.006 0.006 0.052
Malaysia 1980-2012 0.005 0.034 0.096 0.141 0.005 0.011 0.005 0.011 0.003 0.006 0.007 0.012
Mexico 1985-2014 0.245 0.002 0.271 0.000 0.006 0.068 0.008 0.038 0.004 0.059 0.006 0.008
Morocco 1985-2008 0.018 0.386 0.155 0.302 0.032 0.362 0.164 0.436 0.016 0.144 0.103 0.314
Netherlands 1957-1992 0.164 0.534 0.016 0.126 0.021 0.228 0.006 0.066 0.003 0.088 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.071 0.002 0.003
Norway 1946-2013 0.000 0.019 0.005 0.052 0.001 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001
Paraguay 1962-2014 0.090 0.231 0.033 0.088 0.019 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.019 0.000 0.000
Peru 1960-2014 0.140 0.082 0.087 0.068 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
Portugal 1914-1998 0.028 0.042 0.017 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.084 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004
South Africa 1967-2014 0.025 0.078 0.007 0.025 0.003 0.015 0.002 0.008 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001
Spain 1946-1997 0.007 0.059 0.281 0.568 0.015 0.032 0.015 0.076 0.001 0.010 0.001 0.015 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.003
Sweden 1914-2010 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Taiwan 1962-2014 0.200 0.525 0.471 0.518 0.036 0.182 0.026 0.033 0.003 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.012 0.001 0.000 0.000
Turkey 1977-2014 0.683 0.763 0.431 0.658 0.030 0.043 0.021 0.153 0.015 0.017 0.007 0.107
United States 1915-2014 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Venezuela 1962-1998 0.214 0.422 0.118 0.367 0.032 0.031 0.012 0.086 0.009 0.123 0.064 0.063 0.010 0.129 0.082 0.070
Gold Standard period
Canada 1873-1907 0.157 0.085 0.051 0.027 0.055 0.133 0.041 0.132 0.049 0.183 0.000 0.027 0.039 0.149 0.001 0.058
Denmark 1875-1913 0.028 0.012 0.009 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.015 0.019 0.029 0.048 0.006 0.004 0.037 0.063 0.003 0.004
Finland 1867-1913 0.003 0.017 0.004 0.028 0.001 0.010 0.003 0.018 0.001 0.019 0.006 0.024 0.001 0.027 0.004 0.030
Germany 1876-1913 0.126 0.147 0.010 0.023 0.006 0.028 0.001 0.013 0.012 0.086 0.001 0.018
Italy 1861-1913 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.002
Norway 1830-1913 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Spain 1874-1913 0.010 0.095 0.008 0.031 0.000 0.015 0.002 0.022 0.009 0.035 0.002 0.004 0.011 0.038 0.004 0.004
Sweden 1871-1913 0.006 0.010 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.017 0.000 0.005 0.011 0.020 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.004
United States 1869-1913 0.002 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.002 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.005
Note: Based on 10,000 bootstrap replications of estimated ARIMA processes. Tests are with an intercept and a time trend for the logarithms of
nominal and real GDP and nominal and real M2, and with an intercept and no time trend for the other series.
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B Additional figures
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Figure B.1: Cointegration residuals based on the semi-log specification
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Figure B.2: Cointegration residuals based on the semi-log specification
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Figure B.3: Cointegration residuals based on the log-log specification
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Figure B.4: Cointegration residuals based on the log-log specification
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Figure B.5: Cointegration residuals based on the Selden-Latané specification
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Figure B.6: Cointegration residuals based on the Selden-Latané specification
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Figure B.7: Cointegration residuals based on the trivariate specification featuring nominal
M2, nominal GDP, and the short rate.
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Figure B.8: Cointegration residuals based on the trivariate specification featuring real M2,
real GDP, and the short rate.
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Figure C.9: Left-hand side: Log-differences of the Lucas-Nicolini M2 series and the Friedman-
Schwartz M2 series; Right-hand side: M2 velocity (Lucas-Nicolini M2 aggregate) and the
short rate
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Figure C.10: United States 1915-2014: Semi-log specification: Cointegration residuals (left)
and bootstrapped, bias corrected distributions of the coefficient of the short rate (right)
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D Data
The data I use is largely based on the dataset created by Benati et al. (2018), which
was kindly provided by Luca Benati. Almost all of the data are from original sources,
i.e. either original hard copy, or central banks’ or national statistical agencies’
websites. In some cases the data of interest could not be found in original documents.
In those cases the data are either from the International Monetary Fund ’s (IMF )
International Financial Statistics (IFS ), the World Bank, or a dataset by Rolnick
and Weber (1997) (the dataset is available at the ‘WarrenWeber Collection’ at the
website of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis). The sources of the data series
not coming from their dataset are reported in the table below.
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Table D.5: Data sources for the additional series in the dataset
Country Series and time period Data source Details
Argentina M2, 1884-1994 RW dataset
Belize M2, 1977-2014 CB of Belize
Brazil M2, 1901-1987, 1960-2012 RW dataset, World Bank linked via splicing in 1960
Colombia M2, 1955-2012 IFS
Denmark M2, 1975-1921, 1923-2011 Abildgren (2006), Abildgren (2012) for the period 1975-1921: ’broad money’
Finland M2, 1866-1985 Haavisto (1992)
Germany M2, 1876-1923, 1948-1992 RW dataset
Guatemala M2, 1980-2014 Banco de Guatemala ’M2 Medios de Pago-Millones de quetzales’
Israel M2, 1982-2014 Bank of Israel
Italy M2, 1948-1998 Banca d’Italia
Japan M2, 1955-2013 IFS
Jordan M2, 1964-2015 CB of Jordan
Korea M2, 1960-2014 CB of Korea
Lebanon M2, 1977-2014 Banque du Liban
Malaysia M2, 1969-2012 Bank Negara Malaysia Table 1.3 of the Monetary Aggregates
Portugal M2, 1854-1998 Banco de Portugal Table 5
South Africa M2, 1967-2014 South African Reserve Bank series code: KBP1373J
Spain M2, 1874-1997 López et al. (2005) Cuadro 9.16 ’Agregados Monetarios, 1865-1998’
Sweden M2, 1871-1959 Jonung (1975)
M2, 1948-1959, 1960-2014 IFS, World Bank linked via splicing
GDP, 1560-2010 Schön and Krantz (2015) nominal and real GDP
short rate, 1856-2002 Historical Statistics Swedena Discount rate
short rate, 2002-2014 Sveriges Riksbank Reference rate
Taiwan M2, 1962-2014 CB of Taiwan
Turkey M2, 1977-2014 CB of Turkey
United States M2, 1869-1908 Balke and Gordon (1986)
M2, 1909-1958, 1959-2014 Friedman and Schwartz (1970), FRED
M2, 1915-2014 Lucas and Nicolini (2015) 1915-1947: Friedman and Schwartz (1970);
1947-1958: Rasche (1990); 1959-2014: FRED
Venezuela M2, 1940-1999 Banco Central de Venezuela
a http://www.historicalstatistics.org/htmldata15/index.html
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